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ALD-168 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 09-4374
                              
ERLA SUNARJO; IMAN MOCHAMAD,
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
                              
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency Nos. A097-752-965, A097-752-966)
Immigration Judge: Charles Honeyman
                              
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 15, 2010
Before:  SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed : April 20, 2010)
                              
OPINION
                              
PER CURIAM
Petitioners Erla Sunarjo and Iman Mahmoud Chanad seek review of a final order
of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  The Government has
moved for summary affirmance of the BIA’s decision.  Because the appeal presents no
2substantial question, we will grant the motion and deny the petition for review.
I.
Lead petitioner Erla Sunarjo is an ethnic Chinese, native and citizen of Indonesia,
and a practicing Christian.  Iman Mochamad, her husband and dependent respondent, is
also a native and citizen of Indonesia.  Sunarjo filed an application for asylum and
withholding of removal less than one year after her arrival in the United States.  Her
application was not based on any allegations of past persecution in Indonesia, but on her
fear of future persecution based on a pattern or practice of persecution of ethnic Chinese
Christians in Indonesia.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied relief because the record
did not support a pattern or practice finding.  AR 31.  In conducting a de novo review of
the dispositive legal issues on appeal, the BIA concluded that the IJ correctly found that
Sunarjo failed to meet her burden of proof for asylum and withholding of removal
because she had not established a pattern or practice of persecution of ethnic Chinese
Christians in Indonesia.  AR 2.  The BIA found that the IJ had correctly applied Lie v.
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537-38 (3d Cir. 2005), and Matter of A-M, 23 I&N Dec. 737,
741-42 (BIA 2005), in reaching its conclusion that no pattern or practice was established
by the record in this case.  AR 3.  The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s decision to deny
Sunarjo’s motion for a continuance to obtain the testimony of a recently-discovered
expert witness, finding that Sunarjo had failed to demonstrate “good cause” for the
continuance or show that her hearing was in any way unfair.  Id.  
Sunarjo filed a timely petition for review arguing (1) that the Board erred in
3affirming the IJ’s denial of her motion for a continuance, and (2) that the Board erred in
finding that she had not met her burden of proving that she and her husband face a
reasonable possibility of persecution in Indonesia.  The Government moved for summary
affirmance of the BIA’s decision.  
II.
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
Because the BIA issued its own opinion, we review its decision rather than the IJ’s.  See
Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, we look to the decision of
the IJ to the extent that the BIA defers to or adopts the IJ’s reasoning.  Chavarria v.
Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  
We have jurisdiction to review an IJ’s decision to deny a continuance, and do so
for abuse of discretion.  Hashmi v. Att’y Gen., 531 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2008). 
We review agency factual determinations for substantial evidence.  Wong v. Att’y Gen.,
539 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  The Board’s conclusions regarding evidence of the
well-founded fear of future persecution are findings of fact.  Id.  We will uphold such
determinations “unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels
it.”  Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 
Where an appeal presents no substantial question, we may take summary action.  See
Third Circuit LAR 27.4.
III.
We first consider Sunarjo’s claim that the BIA incorrectly determined that the
4record evidence did not establish a pattern or practice of persecution against Chinese
Christians in Indonesia.  In order to show a fear of future persecution the applicant must
show a well-founded subjective fear, “supported by objective evidence that persecution is
a reasonable possibility.”  Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1066 (3d Cir. 1997).  The
objective prong is satisfied either by showing that the applicant would be individually
singled out for persecution, or that “‘there is a pattern or practice in his or her country of
nationality . . . of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.’”  Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)).  To constitute a “pattern or practice,” the persecution of the group
must be “systemic, pervasive, or organized.”  Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 233 (3d
Cir. 2008).  In addition, the acts of persecution must be committed by the government or
forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control.  Sukwanputra, 434 F.3d at
637.  The question of whether a pattern or practice exists is a question of fact that must be
determined based on the individual record before the court.  Id. at n.10 (emphasizing that
a pattern or practice finding was not foreclosed by previous holding because that case had
relied on different country conditions evidence).  
Sunarjo’s claim is not that she would be singled out for persecution upon return to
Indonesia, but that there is a “pattern or practice” of discrimination against ethnic Chinese
Christians like herself.  In rejecting Sunarjo’s pattern or practice claim, the BIA found
that the country conditions report in evidence did not establish “systemic, pervasive, or
5organized persecution” of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, and concluded that although “the
door is still open for a finding of pattern or practice” in future cases, “we are not
persuaded that such has been shown here.”  AR 3.  The BIA’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence.  Sunarjo has not distinguished her argument, or the record it is built
on, from similar claims that we have rejected in the past.  See Wong, 539 F.3d at 233-34
(rejecting as “without merit” the contention that “the [2003 and 2004] State Department
reports and other background materials document a pattern or practice of persecution of
Chinese Christians in Indonesia”); Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537-58 (3d Cir. 2005)
(finding that the 1999 Country Report indicated a sharp decline in violence against
Chinese Christians in Indonesia and that the evidence of violence submitted was not
sufficiently widespread as to constitute a pattern or practice).  Although Sunarjo relied on
the State Department Country Report for 2007 (released May 8, 2008), our most recent
decisions have noted that the reports from 2005 to 2007 document a trend toward 
“similar or improved” treatment for Chinese Christians.  See, e.g., Wong, 539 F.3d at
233-34.  As such, we find no error in the BIA’s conclusion that the record in this case was
insufficient to support a finding of a pattern or practice of persecution.  
We next consider Sunarjo’s claim that the Board erred in concluding that the IJ did
not violate her right to due process when he denied her motion for a continuance.  Sunarjo
argues that the IJ should have allowed her to introduce evidence concerning recent
developments in Indonesia because it relied exclusively on precedent in rejecting her
pattern or practice claims.  We disagree.
6An IJ may “grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.”  8 C.F.R.
1003.29.  We review an IJ’s decision to deny a motion for a continuance for abuse of
discretion, and will reverse only if the IJ’s decision is arbitrary, irrational or contrary to
law.  Hashmi, 531 F.3d at 259.  An immigration judge may properly consider the merits
of the underlying application for relief when deciding whether to deny a continuance.  See
Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (considering merits of asylum
claim in deciding to allow case to proceed without counsel). 
 In his oral decision, the IJ concluded that Sunarjo’s pattern or practice claim was
without merit, and denied the motion for a continuance because he was not convinced that
additional evidence would have been probative: 
Although respondent has, on a timely basis, sought a continuance today to
try to get another expert that she has identified who she believes might
indeed conclude that there is a pattern or practice of persecuting Chinese
Christians in Indonesia, even if such a conclusion were reached, based upon
the facts on this record . . . this Court concludes that the organized,
systemic, or pervasive standard has not been met, given the current analysis
and implementation of that standard by the precedents that currently bind
this Court.
AR 66-67.  The IJ did not rely solely on case precedent in making this
determination, but “considered all the evidence in the record,” which included an
affidavit from expert Dr. Jeffrey Winters, a professor with decades of research experience
in Southeast Asia and Indonesia, an affidavit from the Deputy Director for Government
Relations at the International Rescue Committee, articles and communications reflecting
evolving country conditions in Indonesia, as well as the most recent Country Report on
7Human Rights Practices for Indonesia, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor of the Department of State on March 11, 2008.  AR 57-58, 67.  While
due process requires that Sunarjo be given a “reasonable opportunity to present evidence
on [her] behalf,” Adbulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 596 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted), it does not require an IJ to permit unlimited additions to the record if he
determines they would be cumulative or fruitless.  See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d
184, 192 (3d Cir. 2007) (denying continuance to secure expert testimony did not violate
due process where record contained an article by the same expert and there was no
evidence that his in-court testimony would be materially different); Morgan v. Att’y Gen.,
432 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding no due process violation where alien could not
demonstrate how additional evidence obtained during continuance would have impacted
the outcome of her case).
We agree with the BIA that the record does not reflect a due process violation or
that the hearings were conducted in a fundamentally unfair manner.  Furthermore,
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Sunarjo failed to show “good
cause” for a continuance.  Not only had other expert evidence regarding the treatment of
ethnic Chinese Christians already been placed in the record, but Sunarjo failed to
demonstrate that the proffered expert testimony would have affected the outcome of the
case.  Under the facts and circumstances presented here, the IJ’s decision was not
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law, and the Board did not err in upholding it.  See
Hashmi, 531 F.3d at 259; Ponce-Leiva, 331 F.3d at 377. 
8Accordingly, Sunarjo’s petition for review does not raise a substantial question on
appeal.  We will therefore grant the Government's motion for summary affirmance and
deny the petition for review.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
